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a priori reasoning as ‘what must be necessary for such-and-such a phenomenon to exist’ (part 2)

But what would it mean for these exceptions to come from within (your mind, as opposed to the external world)? The capacity for allowing exceptions in the external world would seem to be one that would equally allow for exceptions coming from within. As in the empiricist/Lockean sense of the external world as mental representation, thus the two realms aren’t so remote. This capacity doesn’t necessarily mean that such exceptions-from-within must exist, as/or in a Spinozean way, that there are necessary corresponding phenomena of mind (though that is an interesting idea: our mind’s capacity for producing exceptional intuitions as beging learned from a willy-nilly/capricious nature). But this point need not be argued that these internal intuitions exist.

I’m going to make a leap here: once we start to receive exceptions from within, we are intelligent. The extent to which we receive (or produce) intuitions to which we find/take exception in/to, is the extent to which we are intelligent/brilliant. It is the zombie that finds nothing of note coming from within, in the analytic truth sense of the predicate being entailed in the subject; the intuitions of consciousness being ‘entailed in the subject’. It is the robot that behaves according to what is entailed in him. Our capacity for being struck by an intuition, of admitting exceptions, goes beyond the capacity of such a robot/zombie, thus such exceptions are a mark of intelligence. I’ve compared this ‘unintelligent’ robot to an anaytic truth, thus intelligence could be defined in comparison to synthetic judgement, in which something additional is introduced (although not a necessary truth). (And in the Kierkegaardean/existentialist sense of not really existing.)

Here is a little recap, since looking back i’m not sure of the coherency of what was written above. The first paragraph starts with an example of the ‘what must be necessary…’ method, and ends with a thesis about the role of this method being central to philosophy. In the second paragraph I start with the example of the philosophical instinct (kinda self-referrential). Then, instead of trying to support my thesis that this method is central to philosophy, I move on to applying this method (‘what must be necessary…’) to this philosophical instinct. I didn’t have to use an example from philosophy (the problem of universals) in the second paragraph, but that was the train of thought I followed, and looking back on it, using this ‘what must be necessary…’ method on the philosophical instinct would have to give us what must be necessary for the philosophical instinct, and this is a much more interesting topic than the initial thesis. Then I make the leap to what it is to be intelligent/brilliant.